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NOTE
UNITED STATES V. LOUGHRY: FAILING TO “FOLLOW” THE
SIXTH AMENDMENT THREAT POSED BY JUROR SOCIAL
MEDIA ACCESS
AJA POLLACK*
In United States v. Loughry,1 the Fourth Circuit wrestled with whether
the district court abused its discretion in denying former West Virginia
Justice Allen Loughry a Remmer hearing2 after one of the jurors in his federal
criminal trial accessed her Twitter account during trial.3 Although the juror
in question was “following” two journalists who were actively reporting on
the trial, because she had not “liked” or “retweeted” any relevant tweets, the
court affirmed the decision of the district court, holding that any potentially
prejudicial extrinsic contact was too speculative to necessitate a hearing.4
Juror social media access constitutes a threat to Sixth Amendment rights5
© 2022 Aja Pollack.
* J.D. Candidate, 2023, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. This Note is
dedicated to Professor Kathryn Frey-Balter, whose support and mentorship throughout law school
have meant more to the author than she can express. The author wishes to thank the staff of the
Maryland Law Review for their patience, diligence, and thoughtful commentary; in particular, the
author thanks Nancy Dordal, Robyn Lessans, Christine Parola, and Monica Garcia Montes. Nancy
Dordal, especially, provided invaluable guidance, the least of which was ensuring the author could
spell “TikTok.” The author also wishes to thank her husband, Joshua Swetz, for his support,
encouragement, and attention to detail in “auditing” every draft of every paper she produces, this
Note included.
1. 983 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 2020), aff’d on reh’g en banc, 996 F.3d 729 (4th Cir. 2021), cert.
denied, 142 S. Ct. 897 (2022).
2. A Remmer hearing, derived from Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954), is a
hearing to determine whether a juror has been unfairly influenced by extrajudicial contact or
communications during a trial.
3. Loughry, 983 F.3d at 700.
4. Id. at 712. “Following” someone on Twitter refers to clicking “Follow” on that person’s
Twitter feed and subscribing to that person’s posted content. When someone follows someone else
on Twitter, the followed person’s posted content appears automatically on the follower’s home feed.
“Following” people on Twitter, then, is primarily a means of curating the content someone wishes
to see when he or she logs in to the platform; an individual can follow, and thus see, another
individual’s posted content on Twitter even if he or she never chooses to directly interact with that
user’s content. “Liking” a tweet, conversely, refers to directly interacting with another user’s post
by clicking the “Like” button. Similarly, “Retweeting” refers to directly interacting with another
user’s post by clicking the “Retweet” button to display the other user’s post on one’s own Twitter
feed. See New User FAQ, TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/resources/new-user-faq (last
visited Mar. 24, 2022) for more detailed explanations of these terms.
5. See infra Section IV.A.
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that, thus far, courts have struggled to adequately address.6 In Loughry, the
Fourth Circuit succumbed to these struggles, relying on a profound
misunderstanding of how modern social media platforms function.7 In doing
so, it set a higher threshold inquiry for Remmer hearings than dictated by its
own precedent8 and joined the ranks of sister circuits whose similarly
heightened Remmer inquiries pose an imminent threat to Sixth Amendment
rights.9 Given the ubiquitous nature of social media and the fact that it is
increasingly difficult for jurors to avoid contact with potentially prejudicial
information, the court should, instead, have adhered to the minimal threshold
inquiry established by Remmer v. United States10 and reversed the decision
of the lower court.11
I. THE CASE
In October 2017, the Charleston, West Virginia news media began to
investigate suspect purchases by several justices of the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals, including then-Chief Justice Allen H. Loughry
II.12 This coverage and the subsequent federal investigation produced
evidence that Loughry had used state vehicles and other funds for personal
use13 and had, furthermore, obstructed justice during the investigation itself.14
By June 2018, Loughry and several of his fellow justices faced both extensive
criminal charges and independent impeachment proceedings.15
Loughry’s criminal trial commenced in October 2018 and lasted six
days.16 Following two days of deliberation, a jury found him guilty of one
count of mail fraud, seven counts of wire fraud, one count of witness
tampering, and two counts of making false statements to a federal agent.17
Shortly after the jury returned this verdict, Loughry’s counsel was
approached on the street outside of the courthouse by a concerned individual

6. See infra Section IV.B.
7. See infra Section IV.C.
8. See infra Section IV.D.
9. See infra Section IV.E.
10. 347 U.S. 227 (1954).
11. See infra Section IV.F.
12. United States v. Loughry, 983 F.3d 698, 701 (4th Cir. 2020), aff’d on reh’g en banc, 996
F.3d 729 (4th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 897 (2022).
13. Most notably, Loughry was found to have removed a historical desk—the “Cass Gilbert
desk”—from the courthouse and placed it in his private home. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 702.
17. Id. Loughry was also acquitted of several counts, one of which was mail fraud in connection
with his removal of the Cass Gilbert desk from his office. Id.
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who advised him to investigate the Twitter activity of a certain juror—Juror
A.18
A subsequent investigation into Juror A’s Twitter account revealed that
in the four months preceding the trial, she had “liked” or “retweeted” four
tweets that criticized the relevant conduct of the West Virginia Supreme
Court justices.19 Furthermore, it was clear she had accessed Twitter on at
least two days during the trial itself.20 Although on those occasions, she
interacted solely with content related to football, Loughry’s counsel
discovered Juror A was actively “following” two journalists who had been
reporting on the trial and, thus, could have seen their posted content on her
home feed during that time frame.21
Based on this Twitter activity, Loughry filed a motion for a new trial,
or, alternatively, for an evidentiary hearing.22 He alleged that the tweets
“liked” prior to trial evidenced Juror A’s bias against him and, also, that she
had engaged in misconduct by accessing her Twitter account at all while
serving on the jury.23
The District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia denied this
motion, turning Loughry’s attention back to the events of voir dire.24 During
that process, Juror A answered “yes” when asked if she had knowledge of the
impeachment proceedings against Loughry but “no” when asked if she had
knowledge “of this case.”25 When asked if she could set any prior knowledge
aside if asked to serve as a juror, she stated that she would be able to do so,
and Loughry’s counsel declined to question her further.26 The district court
found these responses indicative of a lack of bias, noting Juror A’s
knowledge of the impeachment proceedings may have overlapped with, but
did not equate to, knowledge of the criminal proceedings.27 The court noted,
furthermore, that it had never asked jurors to refrain entirely from interacting

18. Id.
19. Id. at 702–03.
20. Id. at 703.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. United States v. Loughry, No. 2:18-cr-00134, 2019 WL 177476 (S.D.W. Va. Jan. 11, 2019),
aff’d, 983 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 2020), aff’d on reh’g en banc, 996 F.3d 729 (4th Cir. 2021), cert.
denied, 142 S. Ct. 897 (2022).
25. Loughry, 983 F.3d at 701–02.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 703. The court noted, furthermore, that this overlap related primarily to the removal
of the Cass Gilbert Desk; as Loughry had been acquitted of that charge, it seemed unlikely Juror A
had been biased by her prior knowledge on that front. Id.
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with social media; it had only asked them to avoid information relevant to
the case at hand.28
The court, having found not “even a threshold showing of juror
misconduct,” sentenced Loughry and entered judgment.29 Loughry filed an
appeal with the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
challenging solely the denial of the evidentiary hearing that would have
allowed for investigation into the potential consequences of Juror A’s Twitter
use.30
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In Remmer v. United States, the Supreme Court established procedures
for investigating potentially prejudicial extrinsic contact with jurors.31
Section II.A discusses the constitutional justification for and origin of the
Remmer doctrine. Section II.B discusses the evolution of that doctrine in
response to Smith v. Phillips32 and United States v. Olano,33 subsequent
Supreme Court cases. Section II.C discusses the impact of this evolution on
Remmer hearing inquiry in the Fourth Circuit. Section II.D surveys the
circuits who adhere to modified forms of the Remmer doctrine in response to
Phillips and Olano. Lastly, Section II.E surveys the circuits, like the Fourth,
that disregard those decisions and adhere to the original Remmer holding.
A. The Sixth Amendment and Remmer v. United States
Concerns about juror access to extrinsic information are grounded in the
Sixth Amendment, which guarantees criminal defendants “the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury.”34 United States Supreme Court
decisions have long reflected the importance of these Sixth Amendment
protections,35 and, as early as 1892, the Court acknowledged the need for

28. Id. This approach is typical. See infra note 107. It fails to account, however, for the fact
that any interaction with social media may inadvertently expose a juror to information relevant to
the case at hand, especially in a high-profile case. See infra Section I.
29. Id. at 704.
30. Id. at 700.
31. Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954).
32. 455 U.S. 209 (1982).
33. 507 U.S. 725 (1993).
34. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added). As of 1975, these concerns are further reflected
in the Federal Rules of Evidence, which prohibit a juror from testifying regarding “any statement
made or incident that occurred during . . . deliberations,” unless “(A) extraneous prejudicial
information was improperly brought to the jury’s attention; [or] (B) an outside influence was
improperly brought to bear on any juror.” FED. R. EVID. 606(b)(2)(A)–(B) (emphasis added).
35. See, e.g., Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907) (“The theory of our system is
that the conclusions to be reached in a case will be induced only by evidence and argument in open
court, and not by any outside influence, whether of private talk or public print.”).

50

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[VOL. 81:1

procedural safeguards to prevent bias or partiality from impacting jury
verdicts.36 In 1954, perhaps as a result of the increasing ubiquity of the media
in American homes,37 the Court more clearly defined these procedural
protections.38 The Court held, in Remmer v. United States, that in a criminal
case, “any private communication, contact, or tampering, directly or
indirectly, with a juror during a trial about the matter pending before the jury
[was] . . . presumptively prejudicial.”39
This presumption was not
conclusive, the Court clarified, “but the burden rest[ed] heavily upon the
Government to establish,” at a hearing attended by the defendant, that any
extrinsic contact was, in fact, harmless.40 If the government failed to
establish harmlessness during this hearing, the Court continued, a defendant
would be entitled to a new trial.41
B. The Evolution of the Remmer Doctrine
Remmer’s defendant-friendly holding has not been overturned by the
Supreme Court.42 The language employed by the Court in subsequent cases
involving juror impartiality, however, led to questions regarding its proper
application.43 Smith v. Phillips was the first of these cases. Although the
Supreme Court in Phillips maintained that Remmer hearings were necessary
to address occurrences involving juror bias,44 its discussion of the applicable
burden of proof deviated significantly from that in Remmer. A Remmer
hearing, the Phillips Court concluded, gave a defendant “the opportunity to
prove actual bias.”45 This was a far cry from the language employed by the
actual Remmer Court, which noted that the burden to prove lack of bias
36. See Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 149–50 (1892) (noting that any suspicion of
juror interference creates a rebuttable presumption that a new trial is warranted).
37. In 1946, only six thousand television sets were in use in the United States. Mitchell
Stephens,
History
of
Television,
GROLIER
ENCYCLOPEDIA,
https://stephens.hosting.nyu.edu/History%20of%20Television%20page.html (last visited Apr. 9,
2022). By 1951, that number had increased to twelve million, and, by 1955, half of all United States
homes had a television set. Id.
38. Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229–30 (1954).
39. Id. at 229.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 230.
42. The Loughry Court, itself, relied on Remmer. See United States v. Loughry, 983 F.3d 698,
704–05 (4th Cir. 2020) (explaining the Remmer doctrine), aff’d on reh’g en banc, 996 F.3d 729 (4th
Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 897 (2022).
43. See, e.g., United States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 521, 532 (6th Cir. 1984) (questioning
whether the Supreme Court had “so changed the rules relating to unauthorized communications with
jurors that the presumptive prejudice standard as applied [by Sixth Circuit precedent] no longer
govern[ed]”).
44. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982) (noting judges must be “ever watchful to
prevent prejudicial occurrences and to determine the effect of such occurrences when they happen”).
45. Id. at 215 (citing Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229).
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“rest[ed] heavily upon the Government.”46 Furthermore, the Phillips Court
strongly implied that the occurrences necessitating Remmer hearings were no
longer presumptively prejudicial, declining to automatically impute bias to a
juror who applied for employment with the district attorney’s office during
the course of the trial.47
Roughly a decade later, the Supreme Court in United States v. Olano
came to similarly ambiguous conclusions in its discussion of Remmer
hearings.48 The Court noted that “[t]here may be cases where an intrusion
should be presumed prejudicial,” but the “ultimate inquiry” should be: “Did
the intrusion affect the jury’s deliberations and thereby its verdict?”49 Some
courts viewed this language as having abrogated Remmer’s presumptive
prejudice framework, absolving the government of its automatic burden to
prove harmlessness absent some initial, threshold inquiry.50
C. The Remmer Doctrine in the Fourth Circuit: The “More Than
Innocuous” Test
The Fourth Circuit has, by and large, adhered to the provisions of the
original Remmer holding. In Stockton v. Virginia,51 the court addressed the
assumption that the presumption of prejudice established by Remmer had
been overturned by Phillips.52 The court differentiated circumstances
involving “extrajudicial communications” from those involving juror bias,
concluding that Phillips only dealt with the latter.53 Accordingly, it found
that extrajudicial communication with a juror remained presumptively
prejudicial.54 The court affirmed, furthermore, that in cases involving such
contact, “the government [bore] the burden of establishing the nonprejudicial
character of [that] contact.”55
Two decades later, in United States v. Lawson,56 the court addressed the
ambiguities presented by Olano. The court interpreted Olano as having

46. Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229.
47. Phillips, 455 U.S. at 215.
48. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 739 (1993).
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., United States v. Sylvester, 143 F.3d 923, 934 (5th Cir. 1998) (“[O]nly when the
court determines that prejudice is likely should the government be required to prove its absence.”);
United States v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490, 497 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“[T]he district court was
correct . . . to inquire whether any particular intrusion showed enough of a ‘likelihood of prejudice’
to justify assigning the government a burden of proving harmlessness.”).
51. 852 F.2d 740 (4th Cir. 1988).
52. Id. at 744.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. (citations omitted).
56. 677 F.3d 629 (4th Cir. 2012).
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merely held that inquiry during a Remmer hearing could be framed as either
a “rebuttable presumption,” as in Remmer itself, or as a more “specific
analysis of the intrusion’s effect on the verdict.”57 The court did not find
Olano to have dictated the latter.58 The court noted, furthermore, that it had
continued to apply the “Remmer presumption” long after the Olano
decision.59 Accordingly, “the Remmer rebuttable presumption remain[ed]
[a]live and well in the Fourth Circuit.”60
The Fourth Circuit, then, has continued to assess allegations of
extrajudicial influence by adhering to the two basic tenets of the original
Remmer holding:61 (1) external contact with a juror is presumptively
prejudicial, and (2) a defendant who presents a credible allegation of such
contact is entitled to an evidentiary hearing in which the government must
rebut that presumption.62
In light of this adherence, the Fourth Circuit employs a three-part
process in analyzing allegations of extrajudicial juror contact.63 First, the
party alleging improper contacts bears an initial burden of introducing
evidence to show those “contacts were ‘more than innocuous
interventions.’”64 If this “minimal standard” is met, the Remmer presumption
of prejudice is triggered, and a hearing is held.65 This hearing constitutes the
second step.66 The court then moves to the final step, where the burden shifts
to the government, which must prove the contacts were harmless, or,

57. Id. at 642.
58. Id.
59. Id. See, e.g., United States v. Cheek, 94 F.3d 136, 141 (4th Cir. 1996) (applying the Remmer
presumption three years after Olano).
60. Id.
61. See Barnes v. Joyner, 751 F.3d 229, 250 (4th Cir. 2014) (noting the continuing importance
of Remmer in explaining “that without a hearing, a criminal defendant is deprived of the opportunity
to uncover facts that could prove a Sixth Amendment violation” (citing Remmer v. United States,
347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954))).
62. Id. at 242.
63. Cheek, 94 F.3d at 141.
64. Id. (quoting Haley v. Blue Ridge Transfer Co., 802 F.2d 1532, 1537 n.9 (4th Cir. 1986)).
It should be noted that requiring this threshold inquiry departs somewhat from Remmer’s formula,
which established that any extrinsic contact is presumptively prejudicial. Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229.
The Fourth Circuit has reasoned, however, that an automatic presumption of prejudice may not be
justified when a contact is so innocuous as to be an obvious non-issue. Haley, 802 F.2d at 1537 n.9.
This initial inquiry is also expressed as follows: “A defendant seeking a Remmer hearing must
present a ‘credible allegation’ that ‘an unauthorized contact was made,’ and that the contact ‘was of
such a character as to reasonably draw into question the integrity’ of the trial proceedings,
constituting ‘more than an innocuous intervention.’” United States v. Johnson, 954 F.3d 174, 179
(4th Cir. 2020) (quoting Barnes v. Joyner, 751 F.3d 229, 242–45 (4th Cir. 2014)).
65. Cheek, 94 F.3d at 141.
66. Id.
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essentially, that there was no “reasonable possibility that the jury’s verdict
was influenced by” external information.67
In United States v. Small,68 the court, relying on Remmer, articulated the
first step of this process more explicitly, laying out the factors to be
considered in determining whether a contact is “more than innocuous.”69 A
contact is “more than innocuous,” the court noted, if it constitutes “(1) any
private communication; (2) any private contact; (3) any tampering; (4)
directly or indirectly with a juror during trial; (5) about the matter before the
jury.”70 The Small court held, considering these factors, that a Remmer
hearing was not warranted when a juror was merely watched by unidentified
individuals while leaving the courthouse; being watched, alone, did not
constitute “contact.”71
D. The Phillips/Olano Circuits
Several circuits have deviated from this Fourth Circuit approach,
holding that either Phillips or Olano significantly modified the Remmer
formula. The Sixth Circuit, for example, has repeatedly held that Phillips
shifted the burden of proving bias or harm during Remmer hearings
conclusively to the defendant.72 Accordingly, in determining whether a
Remmer hearing is justified, the Sixth Circuit considers whether the
defendant has raised “a ‘colorable claim of extraneous influence.’”73 If the
defendant is found to have done so, a Remmer hearing is warranted, but the
burden remains with the defendant to then prove the extrajudicial contact
engendered actual bias.74 Although this burden shift is patently governmentfriendly, the Sixth Circuit’s threshold “colorable claim” test is a particularly
lenient one.75 In United States v. Harris,76 for example, a court found a
Remmer hearing was warranted based on the mere possibility a juror had
discussed the trial with his girlfriend.77

67. Id. (quoting Stephens v. South Atlantic Canners, Inc., 848 F.2d 484, 488–89 (4th Cir.
1988)).
68. 944 F.3d 490 (4th Cir. 2019).
69. Id. at 504.
70. Id. (quoting Cheek, 94 F.3d at 141).
71. Id. at 505.
72. See, e.g., United States v. Zelinka, 862 F.2d 92, 95 (6th Cir. 1988).
73. United States v. Lanier, 988 F.3d 284, 294 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Davis,
177 F.3d 552, 557 (6th Cir. 1999)).
74. Id. at 295.
75. See infra text accompanying note 77.
76. 881 F.3d 945 (6th Cir. 2018).
77. Id. at 954.
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The Fifth and D.C. Circuits have similarly held that Phillips and Olano
modified the Remmer framework.78 These circuits do not go so far as to
automatically shift the burden to the defendant during an actual Remmer
hearing, but they have held the government only bears that burden if a court
has concluded, first, that prejudice is likely to have resulted from an
extraneous contact.79
The Eighth Circuit takes a similar approach, holding a defendant must
prove “a reasonable possibility of prejudice to the verdict” for a Remmer
hearing to be warranted in the first place.80 It departs from Remmer even
further, however, by finding that even when that threshold inquiry is met,
judges retain considerable discretion in determining whether holding a
hearing is the best course of action.81 Though the Eighth Circuit has, on
occasion, applied the “colorable claim” test employed by the Sixth Circuit, it
sets a higher bar for what constitutes a colorable claim.82 In United States v.
Wintermute,83 for example, the court found an allegation that a juror had
“probably” found information on the internet to be too speculative to warrant
further action.84
Although the First Circuit has declined to explicitly address whether
Remmer remains good law following Phillips and Olano,85 its holdings
largely imply at least some reliance on the latter.86 In United States v.
Boylan,87 for example, the court held that the Remmer “presumption is
applicable only where there is an egregious tampering or third party
communication which directly injects itself into the jury process.”88
The Ninth Circuit, similarly, has relied implicitly on Olano, interpreting
it to have held that only circumstances directly involving jury tampering
warrant an immediate Remmer hearing.89 In all other circumstances, courts
“must consider the content of the allegations, the seriousness of the alleged

78. See supra note 50.
79. See supra note 50.
80. United States v. Tucker, 137 F.3d 1016, 1030 (8th Cir. 1998).
81. United States v. Schoppert, 362 F.3d 451, 459 (8th Cir. 2004) (noting trial judges have
“discretion in determining what steps, if any, are required to make certain that a jury has not been
tainted”).
82. See infra text accompanying note 84.
83. 443 F.3d 993 (8th Cir. 2006).
84. Id. at 1003.
85. United States v. Bradshaw, 281 F.3d 278, 288 (1st Cir. 2002).
86. See infra text accompanying note 88.
87. 898 F.2d 230 (1st Cir. 1990).
88. Id. at 261 (emphasis added).
89. United States v. Brande, 329 F.3d 1173, 1176 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Olano as standing for
the proposition that certain conduct does not trigger an automatic Remmer hearing).
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misconduct or bias, and the credibility of the source” to establish whether a
hearing is necessary.90
E. The Remmer Circuits91
The remaining circuits, in overtly denying the influence of Olano and
Phillips on Remmer’s rebuttable presumption framework, largely rely on the
original Remmer holding. The Seventh Circuit takes the Fourth Circuit
approach to Remmer, and, together, they represent the “more than innocuous”
circuits.92 The tests the remaining circuits apply in analyzing allegations of
extrajudicial contact, however, vary widely.93
The Second Circuit, for example, has adhered more strictly to Remmer
than even the Fourth Circuit, holding that “the law presumes prejudice from
a jury’s exposure to extra-record evidence” and forgoing any threshold
inquiry as to whether a hearing is warranted.94 The government must rebut
this presumption of prejudice, and courts accordingly consider “(1) the nature
of the information or contact at issue, and (2) its probable effect on a
hypothetical average jury.”95 The Third Circuit takes a similar approach in
holding that a Remmer hearing should be held in response to any extrajudicial
contact.96 During that hearing, however, not only must the government prove
the communication did not prejudice the defendant, the court must also
conduct a voir dire of all affected jurors.97
The Tenth Circuit has interpreted Remmer more literally and, thus, more
narrowly than the other circuits; it has held that Remmer applies only in
circumstances involving improper juror contact with a third party, and, even
then, only when that contact is “about the matter pending before the jury.”98

90. Id. at 1176–77 (quoting United States v. Angulo, 4 F.3d 843, 847 (9th Cir. 1993)).
91. The Eleventh Circuit is omitted from this discussion; although it adheres to the Remmer
rebuttable presumption of prejudice, it does not appear to have a consistent standard for doing so.
See United States v. Ronda, 455 F.3d 1273, 1299 n.36 (11th Cir. 2006) (describing conflicting
precedent regarding Eleventh Circuit interpretation of Remmer).
92. United States v. Martin, 692 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Whitehead v. Cowan,
263 F.3d 708, 725–26 (7th Cir. 2001)) (noting that where extrajudicial contact is “ambiguous or
innocuous, no Remmer hearing may be necessary”).
93. See United States v. Farhane, 634 F.3d 127, 168–69 (2d Cir. 2011) (applying the test
employed by the Second Circuit); United States v. Vega, 285 F.3d 256, 266 (3d Cir. 2002) (applying
the test employed by the Third Circuit); United States v. Robertson, 473 F.3d 1289, 1294 (10th Cir.
2007) (applying the test employed by the Tenth Circuit).
94. Farhane, 634 F.3d at 168 (citing Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954)).
95. Id. at 169 (citing United States v. Schwarz, 283 F.3d 76, 99 (2d Cir. 2002)).
96. Vega, 285 F.3d at 266.
97. Id.
98. Robertson, 473 F.3d at 1294 (quoting Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229).
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III. THE COURT’S REASONING
Judge Niemeyer, writing for the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals,
affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that it had not abused its
discretion in denying Loughry’s request for an evidentiary hearing when no
evidence suggested that Juror A’s access to social media had robbed Loughry
of a fair trial.99
The court first addressed Loughry’s argument that, under Remmer, Juror
A’s use of her Twitter account during the trial itself entitled Loughry to an
evidentiary
hearing.100
The
Remmer
Court
held
that
“communication . . . with a juror during a trial about the matter pending
before the jury is . . . deemed presumptively prejudicial” and that a defendant
should be permitted to determine the extent of that prejudice “in a hearing
with all interested parties.”101 The Fourth Circuit acknowledged this holding,
but found Loughry had failed to “present ‘a credible allegation that an
unauthorized contact was made.’”102 Loughry’s claims that Juror A had been
exposed to information about the trial itself, the court reasoned, were merely
speculative.103 According to the court, although Juror A had accessed her
Twitter account during the trial, she had only interacted with tweets about
football, and Loughry could not prove she had even seen, much less read, a
potentially prejudicial tweet posted by one of the journalists she followed.104
The court also noted the illogical implications of Loughry’s argument: if
Juror A’s mere access to social media was sufficient to entitle Loughry to a
hearing under Remmer, every juror in the case would be similarly
implicated.105
The court rejected Loughry’s related argument that Juror A had
nonetheless engaged in misconduct by violating instructions that she avoid
social media entirely during the trial on similar grounds.106 The court
acknowledged the dangers modern social media poses to jury impartiality,
noting that model jury instructions had been revised to explicitly address that
very issue.107 The court noted, however, that nowhere in these revised model
99. United States v. Loughry, 983 F.3d 698, 712 (4th Cir. 2020), aff’d on reh’g en banc, 996
F.3d 729 (4th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 897 (2022).
100. Id. at 704.
101. Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229–30.
102. Loughry, 983 F.3d at 705 (quoting United States v. Johnson, 954 F.3d 174, 179 (4th Cir.
2020)).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 707.
107. Id. at 706 (“To remain impartial jurors . . . you must not communicate with anyone about
this case, whether in person, in writing, or through email, text messaging, blogs, or social media
websites and apps (like Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, LinkedIn, YouTube, WhatsApp, and
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instructions, or elsewhere, are jurors forbidden from accessing social media
to discuss non-case-related materials.108 Loughry’s argument, then, that the
jury had, on a single occasion, been told that they should “avoid all social
media” was disingenuous; a reasonable juror would have known “that social
media was prohibited only in connection with the case.”109
Next, the court addressed Loughry’s argument that because Juror A had
interacted with tweets involving the facts of the case during the four months
prior to trial, she had lied during voir dire when asked about her prior
knowledge.110 The court shot down this argument on much the same grounds
as the district court.111 The tweets Juror A interacted with prior to the trial
indicated only that she had knowledge of the impeachment proceedings, and
she fully admitted to having this knowledge during voir dire.112 Loughry
presented no evidence, however, that Juror A had interacted with tweets that
related to the criminal proceedings at issue, so there was no reason to believe
she had been dishonest in asserting she had no knowledge of those
proceedings.113 Furthermore, the court reasoned that Loughry’s counsel,
knowing that the facts of the impeachment proceedings overlapped with
those of the criminal ones, could simply have chosen to ask more questions
of Juror A.114 They failed to do so, however, and were “satisfied to let her sit
on the jury.”115
Lastly, the court addressed Loughry’s argument that the district court
had abused its discretion in failing to allow him an evidentiary hearing to at
least investigate whether Juror A’s Twitter use had biased her against him.116
The court, in shooting down this argument, noted only that Juror A had stated
during voir dire that she was fully capable of rendering “a verdict based solely
on the evidence at trial.”117 Absent additional evidence, there was no reason
to believe her preexisting knowledge of the impeachment proceedings

Snapchat).” (quoting JUD. CONF. COMM. ON CT. ADMIN. AND CASE MGMT., PROPOSED MODEL
JURY INSTRUCTIONS: THE USE OF ELECTRONIC TECHNOLOGY TO LEARN OR COMMUNICATE
ABOUT
A
CASE
(2020),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/proposed_model_jury_instructions.pdf)).
108. Id. at 707.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 709.
111. Id. at 710.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 711.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 712.
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prejudiced Loughry in any way.118 As such, the district court had not abused
its discretion in failing to grant him an evidentiary hearing.119
Judge Diaz, in his dissenting opinion, disagreed with the court’s
conclusion as to Loughry’s first argument.120 Under Remmer, Judge Diaz
argued, Loughry was entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine the
extent of Juror A’s Twitter activity during the trial itself.121 Judge Diaz noted,
first, that the two reporters followed by Juror A posted about the criminal
proceedings a combined total of seventy-three times during the trial, so
merely scrolling through her home feed could have exposed Juror A to
prejudicial information.122 Judge Diaz acknowledged the speculative nature
of this argument; he argued, however, that it would have been impossible for
Loughry to acquire direct evidence without the benefit of an evidentiary
hearing during which he could further question Juror A.123 In light of this,
and because Loughry’s circumstantial evidence alone was stronger than that
present in cases where Remmer hearings had been granted in the past,124
Judge Diaz argued the majority had erred in failing to do the same. 125
IV. ANALYSIS
In United States v. Loughry, the Fourth Circuit upheld the district court’s
decision to deny a defendant a Remmer hearing after a juror accessed her
Twitter account during his trial and potentially saw tweets relating to the trial
itself.126 Social media access by jurors presents an ongoing problem127 that
courts have struggled to adequately address.128 In affirming the Loughry
judgment, the Fourth Circuit succumbed to these struggles, relying on a
fundamental misunderstanding of how social media platforms like Twitter
display content to users129 and setting a higher threshold inquiry for Remmer
hearings than dictated by its own precedent.130 In doing so, it joined the ranks

118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 713 (Diaz, J., dissenting).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 713–14.
123. Id. at 714.
124. In support of this argument, Judge Diaz relied primarily on United States v. Harris, 881
F.3d 945 (6th Cir. 2018). Id. at 715. The majority, conversely, distinguished Harris, finding that
the defendant had “presented a colorable claim of extraneous influence on a juror” where Loughry
had not. Id. at 707 (majority opinion) (quoting Harris, 881 F.3d at 948).
125. Id. at 714 (Diaz, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 712.
127. See infra Section IV.A.
128. See infra Section IV.B.
129. See infra Section IV.C.
130. See infra Section IV.D.
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of sister circuits whose similarly heightened Remmer inquiries pose an
imminent threat to Sixth Amendment rights.131 Given the ubiquitous nature
of social media and the fact that it is increasingly difficult for jurors to avoid
contact with potentially prejudicial information, the Fourth Circuit should,
instead, have adhered to the minimal threshold inquiry established by its own
precedent and the original Remmer holding and reversed the decision of the
lower court.132
A. Social Media Access Represents a Threat to Sixth Amendment
Rights Exceeding That Posed by Access to Traditional Forms of
News Media
The increasing prevalence of social media has troubling implications for
Sixth Amendment rights.133 A juror prior to the advent of social media could
easily avoid picking up a newspaper or flipping to suspect channels on the
television while fulfilling his or her duties; now, however, the process of
avoiding extrinsic contact or information is considerably more difficult.134
These difficulties are twofold. First, in the age of social media, a juror
need no longer actively seek out extrinsic information—that information may
simply be thrust upon them.135 Users of platforms like Facebook, Twitter,
and TikTok136 “are involuntarily exposed to a wide range of information just
by logging into their accounts.”137 Because that information is tailored to a
user’s location, an unsuspecting juror can stumble upon content relevant to a
local trial, having made no conscious attempt to seek out that information.138
This issue is, of course, compounded for jurors serving on high profile cases,

131. See infra Section IV.E.
132. See infra Section IV.F.
133. See Nancy S. Marder, Jurors and Social Media: Is a Fair Trial Still Possible?, 67 SMU L.
REV. 617 (2014) for further discussion of these implications.
134. Id. at 628.
135. Id. (“[W]ith the advent of social media, the discussion is round-the-clock and references to
a trial can pop up anywhere.”).
136. TikTok may be even more problematic than Twitter, in that many users scroll through
content using the platform’s “For You feed,” a complex and somewhat mysterious
“recommendation system that delivers content to each user that is likely to be of interest to that
particular user.” How TikTok Recommends Videos #ForYou, TIKTOK (Jun 18, 2020),
https://newsroom.tiktok.com/en-us/how-tiktok-recommends-videos-for-you.
A TikTok user
viewing this feed sees not only videos from individuals they actively “follow” but also a seemingly
infinite stream of additional videos “curated” by the platform. Id.
137. Daniel J. Ain, The Tweeting Juror: Prophylactic and Remedial Methods for Judges to
Manage the Risk of Internet-Based Juror Misconduct, 98 MASS. L. REV. 16, 17 (2016).
138. Twitter Trends FAQ, TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/using-twitter/twitter-trendingfaqs (last visited Feb. 21, 2022) (“Location Trends identify popular topics among people in a
specific geographic location.”).
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where social media platforms are flooded with information and speculation
likely to bias a juror.139
The second difficulty posed by social media is that the algorithms used
by these platforms make it difficult to avoid information if one has engaged
with similar content in the past.140 The algorithms employed by Twitter, for
example, ensure that users’ “Home timeline[s]” display “recommendations
of other content [Twitter] think[s] [they] might be interested in based on
accounts [they] interact with frequently, Tweets [they] engage with, and
more.”141 A juror then, such as Juror A, who has engaged with tweets about
a case or related matters prior to serving on a trial, is likely to see similar
content on her Home timeline in the future.142 This prejudicial contact would
occur, to some extent, even in a situation where the juror was not actively
following potentially problematic accounts, as Juror A was.143
To analogize the dangers posed by these platforms with those posed by
traditional news media is illogical. If a person turns on her television and
flips immediately to a football game, she is in very little danger of suddenly
encountering a news program. The algorithms used by social media
platforms, however, dramatically increase the chance that a juror with even
a passing prior interest in the events of her case will come into contact with
extrinsic information.144 Her television will switch to that news program, so
to speak, whether she wishes it to or not.
B. Common Measures Taken to Prevent Juror Social Media Access Are
Insufficient to Protect Defendants’ Sixth Amendment Rights
The en banc oral arguments following the Loughry decision145 suggest
that even those judges who are cognizant of and even knowledgeable about
those Sixth Amendment problems posed by social media access struggle with

139. A simple Twitter search for “Justice Loughry,” for example, produces hundreds, if not
thousands, of potentially prejudicial results, including photos and video.
TWITTER,
https://twitter.com/search?q=Justice%20Loughry&src=typed_query (last visited Oct. 29, 2021).
140. See Rummam Chowdhury & Luca Belli, Examining Algorithmic Amplification of Political
Content
on
Twitter,
TWITTER
(Oct.
21,
2012),
https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2021/rml-politicalcontent (explaining how the
Twitter algorithm analyzes past user engagement to display new, related content).
141. Id.
142. Id. During oral arguments, Judge Wynn demonstrated shrewd understanding of this issue,
urging his peers to “look into what [was] fed into this Twitter algorithm” because Juror A had
engaged with tweets relevant to the trial in the past. Oral Argument at 31:43, United States v.
Loughry,
996
F.3d
729,
729
(4th
Cir.
2021)
(No.
19-4137),
https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/OAarchive/mp3/19-4137-20210503.mp3.
143. See supra text accompanying note 21.
144. See supra text accompanying note 141.
145. See infra Section IV.C for discussion of these oral arguments.
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how to address them.146 It is clear that traditional methods of preserving juror
impartiality, such as changing the venue, delaying the trial, or sequestering
jurors, are not sufficient to protect defendants from this new threat.147 Absent
guidance from the Supreme Court,148 however, or evidence as to the true
scope of the problem posed by juror social media access,149 judges have
struggled to develop systems to replace these antiquated ones.
Some judges have attempted to address the social media problem by
simply banning jurors from accessing electronic devices in either the
courtroom or the jury room.150 Although well-meaning, this approach is
likely ineffective, as it does nothing to stop jurors from accessing these
devices in their homes, where the majority of misconduct undoubtedly
occurs.151
A more common approach across the circuits has simply been to address
the social media problem via the use of adopted model jury instructions,
which ask jurors not to communicate about the trial on any forum.152 Loughry
itself points to the use of these instructions,153 and some evidence suggests
this measure can successfully deter jurors from engaging in improper online
conduct.154 An informal 2014 survey of jurors at both the state and federal
level, for example found that only 47 of the 583 jurors surveyed were tempted
to use social media after receiving jury instructions dictating that they refrain
from doing so.155 A similar, smaller survey conducted two years prior
produced similar results, with several jurors explicitly citing “the judge’s
instructions” as the reason they chose not to access social media platforms or

146. One judge, for example, asked if future “juror voir dire would include requests for the court
to require the perspective jurors to turn over their electronic devices for review by counsel.” Oral
Argument at 4:40, United States v. Loughry, 996 F.3d 729, 729 (4th Cir. 2021) (No. 19-4137),
https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/OAarchive/mp3/19-4137-20210503.mp3.
147. Blake A. Klinkner, Social Media, Jury Trials and the Threat to the Rule of Law, 44 WYO.
L. 42, 44 (2021) (briefly discussing the limitations of these approaches in the modern courtroom).
148. See Ahunanya Anga, Jury Misconduct: Can Courts Enforce a Social Media and Internet
Free Process? We “Tweet,” Not, 18 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 265, 277 (2013) (“The profession needs
guidelines about the use, type of information, and what levels of conduct constitute ‘a serious misuse
of social media.’”) (internal citation omitted).
149. Marder, supra note 133, at 618.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. In 2012, sixty percent of judges reported, in response to a Federal Judicial Center
questionnaire, that they employed the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management
model jury instructions to address social media issues. Hon. Amy J. St. Eve & Michael A.
Zuckerman, Ensuring An Impartial Jury in the Age of Social Media, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 1,
18 (2012).
153. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
154. Amy J. St. Eve et al., More from the #Jury Box: The Latest on Juries and Social Media, 12
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 64, 90 (2014).
155. Id. at 79.
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conduct online research.156 Although these responses are promising, model
jury instructions which ask jurors not to affirmatively engage with social
media platforms do little to prevent the type of conduct at issue in Loughry.157
The Loughry majority made exceedingly clear, after all, that these
instructions solely forbid jurors from accessing social media to communicate
about case-related materials,158 and Juror A never broke that rule; at most,
she logged in and irresponsibly fell victim to a Twitter algorithm.159
Even more stringent, hypothetical jury instructions, asking jurors to
abstain entirely from social media use, would likely be somewhat ineffective
because these platforms are explicitly designed to be addictive.160 The
infinite scroll feature on platforms like Twitter, Facebook, and TikTok, for
example, that generates a constant stream of content on a single page, has
such potential for addiction that Congress has attempted to ban it.161 To
combat the issues presented by social media, then, by simply asking jurors to
abstain from accessing their accounts, may be difficult to impossible,
especially in cases involving prolonged trials.
More nuanced jury instructions requiring both judges and jurors to
employ some technological know-how may be necessary to truly combat the
social media issue.162 During the en banc rehearing following Loughry,
Elbert Lin, Loughry’s attorney, laid out what he described as a “much less
intrusive prophylactic approach” to the problem, than, for instance, searching
juror cell phones to analyze their social media activity.163 He explained that
district courts could simply direct jurors to use Twitter’s filter function or
unfollow any potentially suspect individuals for the duration of trial.164 This
would allow jurors to access their social media accounts as usual, while
reducing the likelihood of inadvertent contact with potentially prejudicial
content.165

156. Eve, supra note 152, at 24. See Marder, supra note 133, at 638–41 for discussion of the
limitations inherent in these surveys, which asked participants to self-report potential misconduct.
157. See supra note 107.
158. See supra text accompanying note 108.
159. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
160. Christian Montag et al., Addictive Features of Social Media/Messenger Platforms and
Freemium Games Against the Background of Psychological and Economic Theories, 16 INT’L J.
ENV’T RSCH. & PUB. HEALTH 1, 6 (2019) (noting several features of social media platforms have
been developed to grasp and hold the user’s attention).
161. Social Media Addiction Reduction Technology Act, S. 2314, 116th Cong. § 3(1) (2019).
162. Oral Argument at 38:43, United States v. Loughry, 996 F.3d 729, 729 (4th Cir. 2021) (No.
19-4137), https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/OAarchive/mp3/19-4137-20210503.mp3.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Of course, this approach is dependent on platforms other than Twitter sharing these contentfiltering features.
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C. The Loughry Court Relied on a Flawed Understanding of How
Twitter and Similar Platforms Display Content to Users
The Supreme Court has come a long way since 2010, when Justice
Scalia referred to himself as “Mr. Clueless” when asked by a House Judiciary
subcommittee whether he had “ever considered tweeting or twitting.”166 First
Amendment cases have inevitably strayed into the realm of social media, and
at least some Justices have, accordingly, demonstrated an increasingly
competent understanding of the platforms on which modern communication
occurs.167 The proceedings following the Loughry decision evidence
attempts by the Fourth Circuit to take similar strides toward increased
understanding of social media, with limited success.168
On February 25, 2021, the Court granted Loughry’s petition for
rehearing en banc.169 The resulting opinion provided little guidance as to
how to address jury social media access in the future, stating only that “[t]he
judgment of the district court is affirmed by an equally divided court.”170 The
May 3 oral arguments were telling, however, especially in their indication
that several judges on the Fourth Circuit may not understand how platforms
like Twitter actually display content to users. The arguments were littered
with analogies to traditional forms of news media, with one judge asking,
“[i]f someone had been reading the Charleston Gazette . . . and the only
information that they were reading the newspaper about [was] an unrelated
event . . . would that warrant a Remmer hearing?”171 Later, when Loughry’s
166. Jordan Fabian, Chairman to Justices: ‘Have Either of Y’all Ever Considered Tweeting or
Twitting?’, HILL (May 21, 2010), https://thehill.com/policy/technology/99209-chairman-tojustices-have-either-of-yall-ever-considering-tweeting-or-twitting-; see also Stephanie Francis
Ward, Justice Breyer’s on Twitter & Facebook, But Don’t Count on Him Friending You, A.B.A. J.
(Apr.
14,
2011),
https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/breyer_on_facebook_but_dont_count_on_him_friending
_you (quoting Justice Breyer as having said he “wouldn’t want to have followers on the tweeter”
(emphasis added)).
167. See Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L., 141 S. Ct. 2038, 2047 (2021) (noting, in a First
Amendment case, the significance of the fact that a cheerleader’s suspect speech had been directed
at “her private circle of Snapchat friends”); Biden v. Knight First Amend. Inst. at Columbia Univ.,
141 S. Ct. 1220 (2021) (Thomas, J., concurring) (examining, with acute understanding of the
platform, the First Amendment implications of the removal of President Trump’s Twitter account).
168. See Alison Frankel, 4th Circuit Skips Chance to Provide Social Media Guidance in W. Va.
Justice’s Case, REUTERS (May 21, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/business/legal/4th-circuitskips-chance-provide-social-media-guidance-w-va-justices-case-2021-05-21/ (“It . . . became clear
in the course of the [en banc] hearing that not all of the 4th Circuit judges understand how Twitter
works.”).
169. United States v. Loughry, 837 F. App’x 251, 251 (4th Cir. 2021).
170. United States v. Loughry, 996 F.3d 729, 729 (4th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 897
(2022).
171. Oral Argument at 20:36, United States v. Loughry, 996 F.3d 729, 729 (4th Cir. 2021) (No.
19-4137), https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/OAarchive/mp3/19-4137-20210503.mp3. The answer to
this question is very likely “No.” See supra Section IV.A. It is much easier, though, for a juror to
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counsel, Elbert Lin, tried to explained that “many people are on Twitter all
the time and don’t do anything that leaves a public trail,”172 a second judge
was quick to rebut, noting that it is also impossible to know “how many times
a juror walks by a newsstand and reads a headline.”173 Ironically, it was
Judge Motz, who prefaced her statement by claiming that she was not very
“technically alert,” who got to the heart of the matter.174 “This person could
have been on Twitter for everything and seen everything,” she said.175 “We
know she followed those people so it would automatically have come up.”176
As the arguments proceeded, however, it became obvious that Judge
Motz, claiming to be behind the times, had a far more nuanced understanding
of the issue than many of her colleagues. Several questions indicated that
judges struggled to understand the very concept of “following” someone on
Twitter, viewing the platform as a means to directly contact individuals or
conflating “following” someone with simply “liking” a tweet.177 One judge
noted, for example, that it would not have been relevant for Remmer purposes
if a juror accessed Twitter solely to tweet to his or her daughter prior to
picking them up after school.178 He then analogized the situation to that of
Juror A, who had only interacted with tweets about football.179 Putting aside
the independent issue that Twitter would almost never be used to contact
one’s child in this way, such contact likely would be relevant for Remmer

avoid potentially prejudicial sections of a newspaper than to avoid potentially prejudicial tweets,
which are displayed somewhat unpredictably, in their entirety, on one’s “home” feed. See supra
Section IV.A.
172. Id. at 25:04.
173. Id. at 25:17. This analogy persisted throughout the oral arguments, with a frustrated judge
ultimately asking how a juror “following” someone could possibly be any different than a juror
failing to cancel a newspaper subscription. Id. at 1:21:58.
174. Id. at 30:38.
175. Id. at 30:54.
176. Id. at 31:02.
177. As a result of this confusion, long and somewhat contentious stretches of the oral arguments
were devoted to judges questioning whether there was explicit proof Juror A had been following
these reporters in the first place. See, eg., id. at 1:17:02 (“Do any of those twitters show her
following the reporters?”); id. at 1:24:34 (“There’s no evidence that she followed the reporters. . . .
She followed some news stories or some individuals during the summer four times in four
months.”). Proof that a Twitter user is following someone is simple to establish—anyone can see
who a Twitter user is following simply by clicking the “Following” button at the top of that user’s
page. New User FAQ, TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/resources/new-user-faq (last visited
Mar. 24, 2022). That Juror A had been following these reporters during the Loughry trial was never
actually in dispute. See United States v. Loughry, 983 F.3d 698, 701 (4th Cir. 2020), aff’d on reh’g
en banc, 996 F.3d 729 (4th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 897 (2022) (“Counsel also learned
that Juror A was ‘following’ two local journalists who had reported on the trial . . .”).
178. Id. at 1:09:55.
179. Id. at 1:10:09.

2022]

FAILING TO “FOLLOW” THE SIXTH AMENDMENT

65

purposes, if said juror was also following reporters who were covering the
trial on which she was serving, as Juror A was.180
The extent to which some of the judges had failed to understand the
concept of following someone on Twitter was perhaps not entirely evident to
Lin until one judge noted, pensively, with three minutes remaining in oral
arguments, that there were “perfectly innocent” ways to “follow” people—
he, himself, liked to follow various comics and sports writers in the daily
paper, for example.181 Lin, with Judge Wynn’s support, then explained in
more detail what following someone on Twitter actually entailed,182 but he
ran up against the clock, and some judges were almost inevitably left
confused.183
Mark Grabowski, an associate professor at Adelphi University who
specializes in internet law and digital ethics, wrote about the failure of the
Supreme Court to “get with the times” in 2012, warning that “[i]f the Court
cannot grasp how business inventions have changed since the Industrial
Revolution, or how communication methods have evolved since Alexander
Graham Bell, then they might make decisions that misapply the law due to a
misunderstanding of the facts about technology.”184 Judge Wynn, during
these oral arguments nearly a decade later, took a similar stance: “Whenever
we wade into developing technology with traditional legal jurisprudence,” he
stated, “our understanding of how it works is critical. . . . We can’t just do it
as though we’re looking at a newspaper.”185 As is evidenced by those
questions posed by the judges during these oral arguments, however, Loughry
was likely decided on exactly that premise—as if Twitter were a traditional
form of news media.186

180. One of the judges emphasized this point shortly thereafter, noting that someone does not
actually have to post or engage with any Twitter content to actively follow someone, such as a
reporter. Id. at 1:13:48.
181. Id. at 1:31:38–1:32:30.
182. Essentially, that content created by the “followed” individual would then be displayed on a
user’s timeline without that user actively seeking it out. See supra Section 0.
183. Oral Argument at 1:33:30, United States v. Loughry, 996 F.3d 729, 729 (4th Cir. 2021)
(No. 19-4137), https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/OAarchive/mp3/19-4137-20210503.mp3.
184. Mark Grabowski, Are Technical Difficulties at the Supreme Court Causing a “Disregard
of Duty”?, 2012 REVISTA FORUMUL JUDECATORILOR, no. 3, 2012, at 18, 20.
185. Oral Argument at 31:18, United States v. Loughry, 996 F.3d 729, 729 (4th Cir. 2021) (No.
19-4137), https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/OAarchive/mp3/19-4137-20210503.mp3.
186. Judge Niemeyer, who wrote the Loughry opinion, was especially prone to analogizing to
traditional forms of media during these oral arguments. Frankel, supra note 168.
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D. In Part Because It Failed to Understand the Technology at Issue,
the Loughry Court Deviated from Its Own Precedent, Raising the
Standard for Remmer Threshold Inquiry
This fundamental lack of understanding undoubtedly contributed to the
Loughry court’s finding that Loughry had failed to make a “credible
allegation” of improper contact.187 Because many judges did not fully
understand what “following” a reporter entailed,188 they did not recognize
that Juror A’s potential exposure to seventy-three tweets regarding the trial
while serving on the jury was far more than “speculative.”189 It is clear, after
all, that Juror A was actively on Twitter when these tweets were published
because she interacted with several tweets about football during the same
time frame; it seems incredibly unlikely, if not impossible, given Twitter’s
algorithms, that she was not exposed to at least some of those seventy-three
potentially prejudicial tweets.190
This issue was compounded, however, by the Loughry court raising the
standard for Remmer threshold inquiry established by its own precedent.191
The Fourth Circuit has traditionally been considered one of the more
generous circuits in terms of granting Remmer hearings.192 As discussed in
infra, it has adhered largely to the guidelines of the original Remmer hearing,
requiring only a “credible allegation” of “more than an innocuous” juror
contact.193 The Loughry court paid lip service to this traditional threshold
inquiry, quoting United States v. Johnson194 in stating that a defendant
seeking a Remmer hearing “must present ‘a credible allegation that an
unauthorized contact was made, and that the contact was of such a character
as to reasonably draw into question the integrity of the trial proceedings,
constituting more than an innocuous intervention.’”195 In its actual analysis,
however, the Loughry court implicitly raised that threshold inquiry, focusing
not on whether Juror A could, credibly, have seen prejudicial tweets but,

187. See supra text accompanying note 102.
188. See supra Section IV.B.
189. See supra text accompanying note 122.
190. See supra text accompanying note 140–143.
191. See supra text accompanying note 62.
192. See B. Samantha Helgason, Note, Opening Pandora’s Jury Box, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 231,
245 (2020) (“[The Fourth Circuit] comparatively places a greater burden on the government’s
rebuttal than on the defendant’s initial showing.”); United States v. Cheek, 94 F.3d 136, 141 (4th
Cir. 1996) (referring to the defendant’s initial showing as a “minimal standard”).
193. United States v. Johnson, 954 F.3d 174, 179 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting Barnes v. Joyner, 751
F.3d 229, 242–45 (4th Cir. 2014)). See supra note 64.
194. United States v. Johnson, 954 F.3d 174, 179 (4th Cir. 2020).
195. United States v. Loughry, 983 F.3d 698, 705 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v.
Johnson, 954 F.3d 174, 179 (4th Cir 2020)), aff’d on reh’g en banc, 996 F.3d 729 (4th Cir. 2021),
cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 897 (2022).
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instead, on whether there was explicit evidence available to prove she had
actually done so.196
A credible allegation, however, need not be rooted in explicit evidence
of improper conduct.197 Ironically, it is United States v. Harris, a case cited
by the Loughry majority, that best stands for this proposition. The majority
distinguished Harris on the grounds that the court, in that case, found
“credible evidence” a juror had discussed the case with his girlfriend.198 That
“credible evidence,” however, was solely that, given the circumstances, said
girlfriend had “potentially” relayed some information she had Googled to the
juror.199 There was no concrete or direct evidence she had actually done so;
nevertheless, the Harris court held “the district court abused its discretion by
failing to conduct [a Remmer] hearing.”200 Far from proving that a “credible
allegation” must be rooted in explicit evidence, Harris implicitly recognizes
that the very purpose of a Remmer hearing is to ascertain whether such
evidence of improper conduct exists once a credible allegation has been
made.201 Judge Diaz emphasized this point in his Loughry dissent.202 He
agreed with the majority in finding that “Loughry’s evidence [was]
admittedly circumstantial,” but emphasized that it would be “impossible to
obtain direct evidence of which tweets Juror A saw without a hearing.”203
The ultimate problem with this raised threshold inquiry is not solely the
departure from precedent, but the fact that social media use such as that at
issue in Loughry would, arguably, never meet the burden imposed.204 As one
of the judges noted in oral arguments, “[t]he nature of this technology is such
that there’s never going to be any direct evidence of someone who simply
looks at his or her feed during the course of a trial.”205 A hypothetical future
juror could, under the standard set by the Loughry court, seek out any
information on social media at all, and, so long as he or she did not engage

196. Id.
197. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 881 F.3d 945, 953–54 (6th Cir. 2017) (finding
circumstantial evidence of improper juror contact sufficient to justify a Remmer hearing).
198. Loughry, 983 F.3d at 706–07.
199. Harris, 881 F.3d at 953–54.
200. Id. at 954.
201. Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954) (requiring a hearing on the grounds
that “[w]e do not know from this record . . . what actually transpired, or whether the incidents that
may have occurred were harmful or harmless”); see supra note 61.
202. Loughry, 983 F.3d at 714 (Diaz, J., dissenting).
203. Id.
204. See Oral Argument at 55:03, United States v. Loughry, 996 F.3d 729, 729 (4th Cir. 2021)
(No. 19-4137), https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/OAarchive/mp3/19-4137-20210503.mp3 (noting that
circumstantial evidence should be sufficient for Remmer purposes).
205. Id.
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with any of that information, the wronged defendant could not procure a
Remmer hearing.206
E. The Combination of Increased Social Media Access and Heightened
Remmer Threshold Inquiry Threatens Sixth Amendment Rights
Across the Circuits
The Fourth Circuit is far from the only circuit where increased threshold
inquiry for Remmer hearings threatens Sixth Amendment rights.207 Of all the
circuits, in fact, only the Second, Third, and Sixth Circuits would likely have
granted a Remmer hearing based on those facts presented by Loughry, where
no direct evidence existed to suggest improper contact had occurred, but such
contact was nonetheless likely.208
The Second Circuit209 and Third Circuit, as discussed infra, often
employ no initial threshold inquiry to determine whether a Remmer hearing
is warranted.210 As such, an allegation, like that made in Loughry, that a juror
could have seen prejudicial tweets, would likely have been sufficient to
trigger a hearing.211 Likewise, although the Sixth Circuit does employ
threshold inquiry, it would likely be bound by its own precedent; in Harris,
speculative but likely social media access was sufficient to implicate
Remmer.212
Those Remmer tests employed by the remaining circuits vary so hugely
that to apply the facts of Loughry to each would involve more bald
speculation than analysis.213 It is sufficient to note, in the wake of Olano and
Phillips, that the majority of these circuits employ significantly higher
threshold inquiry than that required by the initial Remmer holding, and,
accordingly, that it has become increasingly difficult for defendants in many
of these jurisdictions to contest the violation of their Sixth Amendment rights
when jurors access social media.214
206. Judge Wynn spoke to these repercussions during the en banc rehearing. Id. at 39:18.
207. Eva Kerr, Note, Prejudice, Procedure, and a Proper Presumption: Restoring the Remmer
Presumption of Prejudice in Order to Protect Criminal Defendants’ Sixth Amendment Rights, 93
IOWA L. REV. 1451, 1473 (2008).
208. See supra text accompanying note 122.
209. A case remarkably similar to Loughry was recently decided in the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals. United States v. Loera, 24 F.4th 144 (2d Cir. 2022). Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman, the
notorious drug lord, appealed his conviction on the grounds that jurors “followed the trial on social
media.” Aaron Katersky, El Chapo Appeals His Conviction, Argues for New Trial, ABC NEWS
(Oct.
25,
2021),
https://abcnews.go.com/US/el-chapo-appeals-conviction-arguestrial/story?id=80776864.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 94 and 96.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 94 and 96.
212. See supra text accompanying note 77.
213. See supra Sections II.D and II.E.
214. See supra Sections II.D and II.E.
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This deprivation of rights is problematic, especially because juror
misconduct is only likely to increase as social media platforms become more
pervasive.215 The only tool defendants have in their pockets when such
misconduct occurs is the Remmer hearing, and, if it becomes increasingly
difficult to obtain one, a degradation of Sixth Amendment rights is inevitable.
F. To Preserve Sixth Amendment Rights, the Fourth Circuit Should
Have Adhered to the Minimal Threshold Inquiry Established by the
Original Remmer Holding
Social media platforms are not going anywhere,216 and neither are the
threats they pose to Sixth Amendment rights.217 To protect defendants from
these threats, judges on the Fourth Circuit and beyond must take affirmative
steps to familiarize themselves with modern social media platforms; they
cannot remain “ignorant of technology in a way they would be ashamed to
be ignorant of patent or bankruptcy law.”218 With this knowledge in hand,
judges may be able to take a more effective approach to juror social media
misconduct by appropriately adapting jury instructions, thus mitigating,
somewhat, the need to hold Remmer hearings in circumstances such as those
affecting Juror A.219
In the meantime, however, the Fourth Circuit must hold true to the
original Remmer holding and its own precedent by setting a minimal
threshold inquiry for what constitutes a “credible allegation” of juror
misconduct.220 Doing so will help to prevent another Loughry, where judges
failed to grant a Remmer hearing where one was warranted, depriving a

215. Jesse Gessin, Bit by Bit: Breaking Down the Ninth Circuit’s Frameworks for Jury
Misconduct in the Digital Age, 18 NEV. L.J. 709, 733 (2018) (“As new conduits of communication
carry ever increasing depths of content to jurors, trial courts should expect jury misconduct to
skyrocket.”).
216. A Pew Research Center study on social media access in 2021 found that 84 percent of adults
ages 18 to 29, 81 percent of adults 30 to 49, 73 percent of adults ages 50 to 64, and 45 percent of
adults 65 and older use social media platforms, and that use of most platforms has trended upward
or remained consistent over the past decade. Brooke Auxier & Monica Anderson, Social Media
Use
in
2021,
PEW
RSCH.
CTR.
(Apr.
7,
2021),
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2021/04/07/social-media-use-in-2021/.
217. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has declined to provide guidance as to Remmer’s role in
addressing these threats. Although Loughry filed a petition for writ of certiorari on October 18,
2021, Petition for Writ of Certiorari, United States v. Loughry, No. 19-4137 (4th Cir. Oct. 18, 2021),
cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 897 (2022) (No. 21-581), it was ultimately denied. Chris Dickerson, U.S.
Supreme Court Refuses to Hear Loughry’s Appeal, W. VA. RECORD (Jan. 25, 2022),
https://wvrecord.com/stories/619044166-u-s-supreme-court-refuses-to-hear-loughry-s-appeal.
218. Grabowski, supra note 184, at 21.
219. See supra text accompanying note 164.
220. See supra Section IV.D.
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defendant of his Sixth Amendment rights, largely because they did not fully
understand the nature of the technology at issue.221
The bottom line is that granting a defendant a hearing is a small price to
pay to prevent a violation of the Constitution.222 When the next case
involving speculative social media contact inevitably arises, and there is
question as to whether that contact occurred as alleged, the Fourth Circuit
ought to follow Judge Wynn’s simple logic: “Let’s just have a small hearing
to find out.”223
V. CONCLUSION
In United States v. Loughry, the Fourth Circuit affirmed that a defendant
was not entitled to a Remmer hearing when a juror, who was actively
“following” two journalists covering the case, accessed her Twitter account
during the trial.224 This decision exemplifies the dilemma faced by modern
judges, who have struggled to fully understand and adapt to meet the
challenges posed by ubiquitous juror use of social media platforms.225 In
relying on a flawed understanding of how the Twitter algorithm presents
information to its users,226 the Loughry court raised the threshold Remmer
inquiry established by its own precedent227 and joined those circuits where
similarly heightened inquiries threaten the right to an impartial jury
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.228 Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit
should devote itself to a stronger understanding of those social media
platforms, such as Facebook, Twitter, and TikTok, that jurors inevitably use
in their everyday lives; until that understanding is established, however, the
court must adhere to a minimal threshold inquiry for Remmer hearings.229

221. See supra text accompanying notes 187–189.
222. Oral Argument at 1:15:12, United States v. Loughry, 996 F.3d 729, 729 (4th Cir. 2021)
(No.
19-4137),
https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/OAarchive/mp3/19-4137-20210503.mp3
(emphasizing that a Remmer hearing would likely have taken only fifteen minutes).
223. Id. at 1:27:45.
224. United States v. Loughry, 983 F.3d 698, 712 (4th Cir. 2020), aff’d on reh’g en banc, 996
F.3d 729 (4th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 897 (2022).
225. See supra Section IV.A–B.
226. See supra Section IV.C.
227. See supra Section IV.D.
228. See supra Section IV.E.
229. See supra Section IV.F.

